DEMOCRATIC ISOLATION, THIN CITIZENSHIP, AND INSURRECTION

Abstract
Citizens are deeply cynical of the institutions and practice of representative democracy, resulting
in increased isolation and extremism rather than nuanced public debate and democratic
involvement. Three interrelated background conditions have led to this inevitable cynicism: the
erasure of political citizenship by neoliberalism, the ability of technology (especially social
media) to provide perfect information filtering, and the resulting fragmentation of civic
experience. In this article, the authors outline a theory of democratic isolation that was
exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, exploited by populist politicians, and ultimately led to
the January 6th insurrection.
Keywords: January 6th, democratic isolation, neoliberalism, perfect filtering, civic engagement,
populism, COVID-19
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American cynicism has grown in recent years. This cynicism has both been precipitated by and
caused recent events, most notably the U.S. Capitol insurrection on January 6, 2021, when a
combination of isolation, distrust, and emotion culminated in violence. The events of January 6th
were not entirely unexpected. Three interrelated background conditions led to this inevitable
point: the erasure of political citizenship by neoliberalism, the ability of technology to provide
perfect filtering, and the resulting fragmentation of civic experience. These conditions were
exploited by populist politicians and exacerbated by a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic that not only
set the stage for January 6th, but also opened the door for future unrest due to a lack of
connection among citizens, the state, and each other.
Many Americans have become deeply cynical of political power and the institutions
where it is vested in a representative democracy (e.g., Lawless & Fox, 2015). Instead of nuanced
public debate and democratic involvement, the new norm is increased isolation, deep cynicism,
and political extremism. Citizens are routinely told that they alone hold the power to express the
political will of the nation while also being stripped of economic opportunities that would allow
them to exercise that power and the political skills to do so effectively in favor of a thin
description of citizenship under neoliberalism. The resulting resentment is reinforced by
dismissal of the importance of a common set of civic experiences, leading to distrust of
institutions and intermediates alike, and breeding deep cynicism and conspiratorial thinking.1
Finally, the market rules that have come to dominate political discourse means not only that all
discourse is equally valued and amplified, but also that it is both easy and wise for citizens to
filter out anything but those views that reinforce and sometimes radicalize their own beliefs.
In this article, we offer a theory of democratic isolation that was building long before
January 6, 2021. Neoliberalism has shifted the expectations that citizens have of both their own
civic involvement and the legitimacy of the state and political processes more broadly.
Technology has allowed the remaining civic conversation to move online and into the shadows,
eliminating the possibility of any marketplace of ideas to filter out more extreme and violent
viewpoints. The COVID-19 pandemic further isolated people physically while radicalizing many
through online platforms in unprecedented ways. Moreover, populist politicians and pundits
seized the moment and exploited the isolation, despair, and deepening distrust in intellect,
science, and democratic norms that ultimately led to insurrection.
Neoliberalism and the Lament of the Individual Left Behind
The marketization of all facets of life has been ongoing throughout a major portion of the
American experiment, especially in the last 100 years. Neoliberalism has, in sum, marketized
every part of our lives, from education to healthcare and from war to charity. As Foucault (2010)
posited, neoliberalism is distinct in that it works by “taking the formal principles of a market
economy and referring and relating them to, projecting them on to a general art of government”
(p. 131). This mode of governance reaches into all facets of life, pushing out the civic
engagement of citizens not just in governmental activities, but in the general way of being,
working, learning, and existing within society. For our purposes here, the most important
1

Data on political and social trust is readily available from both the Pew Research Center and the General Social
Survey (GSS; available at https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/home). In particular, the Pew Research Center offers an
overview of Americans’ declining trust in government since the 1950s (Pew Research Center, 2021) and a more
recent take on political trust and governmental performance during the COVID-19 pandemic (Pew Research Center,
2020). The GSS and Pew Research Center (Rainie et al., 2019) have also noted a parallel decline in social trust, or
trust Americans have toward their fellow citizens, over the past several decades.
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marketization has been that of democracy. When democratic citizenship falls victim to the rise of
homo economicus, extremism becomes mistaken for patriotism, and distrust in institutions
becomes mistaken for liberty. This has had two important effects on civic participation. First,
individuals who do not or cannot invest in themselves as capital through education and
experience become left behind and disenchanted with society, including its institutions and those
in power. Second, neoliberal rhetoric has diminished the role of citizen for individuals, making it
a lower order concern that often falls to the wayside for more market-driven activities.
Neoliberalism has made it so individuals have to compete in new ways to maintain the
ability to earn and provide for themselves and their families. Classical liberalism holds that
individuals should be free actors to make choices within the marketplace. Neoliberalism inverts
that. A neoliberal subject “is human capital for itself and the state” and as such is at constant risk
of becoming redundant and abandoned—a fear driving much of the political discourse in
populist movements (Brown, 2015, p. 110). Homo politicus, the political citizen, ceases to exist
in favor of a streamlined homo economicus, who not only is focused on their own market value
as capital, but who, over time, loses the skills necessary to be a political actor. The American
experiment relies on democratic values no longer practiced in neoliberal times. The
philosophical tenets relied on at the Founding—from Aristotle to Locke and Rousseau—
presuppose not just market forces that necessitate a state to mediate them but a citizenry
“simultaneously rooted in individual sovereignty and [signaling] the promise of social, political,
and legal respect for it” (Brown, 2015, p. 109). With the contemporary state now governed by
neoliberal rationality, citizenship today is a thin facsimile of what the Founders expected would
be needed to make such an experiment work. In an era when there is no room for regular civic
order and individuals are forced to prioritize economic growth and self-investment over
collective well-being, the modern citizen is an economic actor first and foremost. Any attempt to
act as homo politicus is met with fierce opposition from the neoliberal order, which requires
individuals to invest in their own capital, valued in market terms, leaving behind democratic
participation that simply cannot be measured in terms of return on investment. The problem is
that democracy cannot ever measure up under market terms.
The metrics of the market in neoliberalism, coupled with an animosity over sanctioning
by growing social justice movements, have created a great deal of anxiety, particularly among
those who have either not sought to improve themselves as capital in the new neoliberal order or
have been or are at dire risk of being deemed useless in the neoliberal marketplace. Factory
workers, coal miners, and blue-collar workers truly are feeling the pressure of the neoliberal
rhetoric that has come to dominate both market and polis. The result is new fissures in society
that are often aimed at those in power, those appearing to escape immediate market concerns, as
well as state institutions that presumptively allowed or abetted their situation to deteriorate.
When commentators underscore “economic anxiety” as a root cause of populist tendencies, it is
code for not only racial resentment, but also a visceral fear of being left behind in neoliberal
society. This fear is often consciously and subconsciously coupled with racist and xenophobic
rhetoric.
It is impossible to fully disentangle these two strains of thought, as they so often work
hand in hand with the misogyny that runs deep within them (Bracewell, 2021). In fact, these two
anxieties co-create a sense of loss that encompasses both lost market and social capital. While
the market loss may be real, the perceived social loss is often molded by racial resentment and
those who evoke populist rhetoric to undermine a presumed set of elites. These elites,
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particularly those with specialized expertise or experience, along with communities of color are
framed as receiving an unjust economic or social advantage. Aggrieved individuals caught up in
these populist movements—right-wing or left-wing—are “effectively saying that neoliberalism
isn’t working, that there’s something deeply wrong with the present way of organizing life and
doing business, and that we need to replace it with something dramatically different” (Fraser &
Jaeggi, 2018, p. 194), but they are doing so by undermining civil society.
In recent years, this has led to a great deal of distrust not only in state actors, but also in
the idea of civil society itself. Under neoliberalism, state institutions are not worthy of trust
because they fail to act like the marketplace and seemingly violate the rules of society. The more
extreme versions of this kind of thought convert distrust into a form of patriotism. No longer is
the goal rehabilitation of the state or society but rather an active campaign to undermine both as
illegitimate. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in the Q-Anon movement, in which
conspiracists have latched on to this pervasive sense of distrust to create a narrative about a
government overrun by a cabal of unsavory establishment politicians who are, quite literally,
trying to steal children and prevent the rise of the “true patriot.”
Neoliberalism, the State, and Political Liberty
Democratic values in the 21st century seem incapable of finding merit on their own as
part of a larger common good, instead needing to be justified as requiring some additional
market value at best and not being worth the return on investment in market terms at worst.
Neoliberalism “governs as sophisticated common sense, a reality principle remaking institutions
and human beings everywhere it settles, nestles, and gains affirmation” (Brown, 2015, p. 35).
While liberal democracy may not be perfect and may “fall short of [its] promise and at times
cruelly invert it,” still, “liberal democratic principles hold, and hold out, ideals of both freedom
and equality universally shared and of political rule by and for the people” (p. 18). Neoliberalism
erases the shared ideals of freedom and equality and, in their place, substitutes a notion of market
governance—a notion that necessarily eschews civic engagement in any traditional sense in
favor of a thin form of citizenship and a conceptualization of freedom as market freedom, not
political freedom.
Neoliberalism and its rationality are omnipresent throughout the course of one’s life,
economizing previously “noneconomic spheres and practices ... [that] may not always involve
monetization” (Koray et al., 2009, as cited in Brown, 2015, pp. 30–31). Formal education—a
cornerstone of developing a democratically-minded citizenry—has shifted in purpose from a
normative good that can provide for better citizens and skilled workers to one that can only be
justified by the production of skilled workers, and any attempts to revitalize the civic component
of education are met with great resistance as being futile, unworthy, or unsound. In fact, the postWorld War II United States undertook one of the largest public education projects of its kind,
reaching all social strata but especially making available a quality liberal arts education to the
middle class for the first time in history, largely at the cost of the state (e.g., Newfield, 2008).
However, individuals now bear that cost, and a liberal arts education is increasingly out of reach,
undervalued, and shunned in favor of pure job-training programs (Brown, 2015, p. 180). The
resulting resistance to formal and informal education forecloses an important route to imbuing
citizens with democratic skills and values.
In this way, outward hostility to democratic activity—not just benign neglect—is at the
heart of the movement behind January 6th. A schism between those who appear from the outside
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to be doing well under neoliberalism (i.e., the educated, the white collar, the “elites”) and those
who have visibly suffered at its hands becomes the defining political fault line. The lack of trust
on either side of the equation results in increased isolation and the labeling of those most
immediately left behind by neoliberalism as unsavory, angry, and unworthy of having a voice.
This reinforced the conspiratorial thinking that ultimately sparked the Capitol insurrection. The
insurrectionists saw their activity as patriotism come to life.
Technology and “Perfect Filtering”
The dominance of homo economicus and market governance reinforces and is bolstered
by the advent of hyper-filtering technology, or what some scholars have termed the “daily me.”
As Sunstein (2018) noted, the “daily me” provides citizens the opportunity to filter out (or
“narrow”) information they do not wish to be exposed to—and it goes far beyond just social
media posts from annoying friends or family members. Indeed, today’s technology provides
precise filtering that extends into our civic, public lives, too. The ability to filter gives rise to
group polarization, especially among those who are more sophisticated in their ideological
identities and partisan affiliations. Today’s filtering infrastructure makes it “easier for people to
surround themselves (virtually) with the opinions of like-minded others and insulate themselves
from competing views” (Sunstein, 2018, p. 71). While such enclave deliberation (or deliberation
within groups with a shared identity) is not necessarily a bad thing on a societal scale (i.e.,
groups deliberating within a larger sea of different groups), it can, individually, give rise to
extreme thinking. If enough people are simply looking to confirm their preexisting beliefs and
views, they can likely do so by walling themselves off to anything critical or different.
Filtering endangers social capital development. Democracies without sufficient bonding
and bridging social capital are destined to fail—or at least have serious civic acrimony, making
political deliberation, decision making, and societal harmony more difficult (Putnam, 2000).
Intense filtering undercuts individual and collective abilities to generate social capital, including
bridging capital, or connections with “outside” groups that are not one’s own. In a sea of groups
that emphasize internal identity over shared societal values, policy problems are often interpreted
differently, with definitions using differing facts, ultimately rendering them incapable of easy or
complete resolution. On January 6th, the facts between those inside the U.S. Capitol and the
insurrectionists outside (with notable exceptions) were largely at odds, making any potential
attempt to find a mutually satisfactory solution impossible. More than that, it bred complete
incivility to the point of violence.
Violence does not appear from nothing but is the result of repeated gaps in politeness and
civility in public discourse. Politeness and civility are how individuals demonstrate their respect
for opposing viewpoints (Mutz, 2006b). However, the media’s (and individuals’) increasing need
to highlight incivility and extreme emotional expressions of politics undermines any mutual
respect. This makes for compelling political drama on televisions and elsewhere, but it also
reinforces negative feelings toward political opponents—and this effect cuts across partisan and
ideological divides (Mutz, 2006b, 2015). The turn to anger triggers a physiological response that
makes it extremely difficult for a person to deliberate since they get too worked up to engage in a
civil exchange (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016, 2018; Mutz, 2015; Webster, 2020). It is much
easier to retreat to an echo chamber, especially when one feels like the terms of the game have
been rigged against them and their ideas, which is exactly what many who ultimately
participated in or supported the January 6th insurrection did.
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Pertinent to our discussion is the lack of these cross-cutting political conversations, or
discussions that challenge existing political beliefs and opinions through exposure to the “other
side.” Such conversations are critically important for democratic deliberation, although they
come with a cost of their own: greater ambivalence and decreased political participation (Mutz,
2006a). However, not having cross-exposure to competing ideas and groups may be worse.
Homophily on social media, spurred by filtering, means that those persons more ideologically
charged are less likely to “see” information from the other side, let alone share differing
viewpoints within their community or echo chamber (e.g., Colleoni et al., 2014; Himelboim et
al., 2013; Lee et al., 2014). The result is constant exposure to one set of opinions, inducing
greater confirmation bias, permitting falsehoods to spread more easily, promoting extremism in
viewpoint and action, and making cooperation on shared problems more difficult (Sunstein,
2018).
Inability to hold cross-cutting conversations, especially when one can filter them out,
may permit individuals to avoid feeling uncomfortable, but it comes with significant civic
penalties and reinforces political polarization. On the one hand, those who are walled off may
actually be the more politically engaged, given their strongly held beliefs (i.e., lack of
ambivalence), emotive energy (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016; Mutz, 2006b; Webster, 2020),
and increasing comportment between social identities and partisan identification (Mason, 2015,
2018). As Abramowitz and Webster (2016) noted, though, anger is not irrational; disagreement
with another’s ideological and policy orientations can result in an emotional response. Yet, that
dynamic between anger and engagement among the most polarized or ideologically extreme is
what precisely is animating American political discourse and elections, with explosive effect.
Webster (2020) noted than politicians and candidates seek to reinforce anger in voters—through
claims that are precisely directed at “stoking anger” among supporters—because it wins
elections: An angry voter is a loyal (partisan) voter. The logical conclusion for addressing anger
is to deal with its source. In electoral terms, this means the opposing party. Thus, voters are
increasingly making political decisions not on merits but rather on who they dislike more (thus,
“negative” partisanship; Abramowitz & Webster, 2016). Coupled with an environment that
emphasizes incivility and homogeneity of information, it becomes quite easy for extreme beliefs,
falsehoods, and conspiracies to breed and influence political debates.2 In fact, recent evidence
has demonstrated that cross-cutting conversations on topics of policy do work to lessen hyperpartisan tension (Fishkin et al., 2021). These conversations, however, are hard to coordinate and
no longer happen without intense intervention.
Lack of Common Experiences
A third compounding issue concerns the lack of shared experiences—political and
social—that unite individuals. A polity requires points of common experience to serve as a
defense against factional divides. True, there are still many experiences common to all
Americans. We celebrate national holidays, presidential elections have not lost their ability to
command the nation’s attention, and the COVID-19 pandemic certainly has provided a basis for
shared struggle. However, these events are increasingly becoming common in the simplest sense:
experienced by many. Shared meaning or effect from these common experiences is fleeting.
2

This is despite Americans holding relatively moderate issue positions (Fiorina et al., 2011). Nonetheless, there is
increasing ideological partying sorting in the American electorate (Bafumi & Shapiro, 2009; Levendusky, 2009;
Mason, 2015), and it is especially pronounced amongst the more extreme elements of American society
(Abramowitz & Webster, 2018).
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Worse, some shared experiences have become, much like social identities, intricately linked with
political identities (Mason, 2018).
Disagreement is a hallmark of all democratic societies, and it would be a nonstarter to
seek to end political disagreement (one is reminded of Madison’s thoughts in Federalist 10
regarding innate factional spirits). Arguably, these common experiences help promote societal
trust and reciprocity, vital ingredients needed for a functional society that allows for such
political debate by an engaged citizenry (Hetherington, 2005; Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015).
Collective decision making relies on a measure of trust and a sense of shared outcomes.
Sociopolitical, cultural, and crisis events on a national, or societal, scale can provide these
common enterprises that serve catalysts for not only serendipitous exposure to cross-cutting
information (Sunstein, 2018), but also conversations about shared societal problems.
There is another, perhaps more important, common experience that has atrophied to the
point of catastrophe: civil society. Common civic experiences have become another means of
emphasizing disagreements rather than appreciating the commonality of the event. Indeed, most
Americans prefer democracy by “stealth”—“Let politicians and, even better, independent experts
make decisions so long as I do not” (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002)—although people certainly
want these decisionmakers to be egalitarian and empathetic to their interests. Similarly, many
have stopped learning the habits of democracy through participation in civil organizations that
not only teach civic skills but also provide common experience and forums for cross-cutting
conversations.
As Applebaum (2018) and Putnam (2000) described recently (in stark contrast to what de
Tocqueville saw back in the 1830s; see also Almond & Verba, 1963; Skocpol, 1996), the United
States is no longer a nation of joiners or participants in civil society groups. Through these civic
engagements, Americans internalized norms of democratic governance: the importance of rule of
law, deliberation, participation, and exposure to differing viewpoints. While not easy, democratic
governance’s value lies in “harmonizing discordant interests and empowering (citizens)”
(Appelbaum, 2018). Neoliberal subjects coming together to act politically no longer do so as
democratic actors but instead as a discordant symphony of lost souls. Without any social impetus
to create and maintain shared civic values outside of the market, individuals become increasingly
isolated. With perfect filtering, isolated individuals become increasingly dangerous to a system
built on republican values and imbued with liberalism’s goals of equality and justice.
The COVID-19 pandemic underscores this point. This commonly shared national
(indeed, global) experience does not mean universal agreement in its effect. Shared
experiences—even negative ones—have been known to foster interactions that permit mutual
understanding, building coalition, and even limiting animosity between opposing groups. With
COVID-19, though, it appears that this shared experience is another means of fostering partisan
anger, exploiting filtered information streams for political gain, and any discussion of shared
problems related to COVID-19 breakdown, predictably and unfortunately, along partisan lines.
Scientific consensus was already in a state of declining trust pre-pandemic and has suffered more
with the shifting guidance due to better understanding of COVID-19. To an already distrusting
individual, these shifts appear chaotic and provide evidence of fallibility. Moreover, the policy
determinations based on scientific consensus, from masking to stay-at-home orders, feel
intrusive, buttressing any preexisting notion that government cannot be trusted in Americans’
personal affairs. They also often have real economic consequences to those more vulnerable to
market failure—those who have already been sidelined by neoliberalism. Despite sharing the
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world with COVID-19 and its effects, the experience has only served to create division rather
than unity.3
Americans are still experiencing common events, but they are not sharing them in the
proper sense of the concept. In fact, the rise of homo economicus has meant that the “sharing”
around common experiences is often based on rational, self-interested, and zero-sum definitions.
Competition being the norm of the marketplace turns these shared experiences into acrimonious
ones rather than allowing them to reinforce a sense of shared destiny. Lost is the commonality of
the event; all experience it, and all should take meaning from it. As a result, the public’s
involvement in politics, from pandemics to local government, is more minimalist than many
democratic theorists would prefer or admit (for a review, see Collins, 2021, pp. 790–791).
Elections, despite being perhaps the most common experience in a democratic polity, have
become just another event to prime the populace along sociopolitical fault lines. The citizenship
that results is increasingly devoid of any depth of discussion or debate, and this thin citizenship
is easily broken under the weight of crisis, conspiracy, and partisan politics. “A nation of passive
observers,” argued Applebaum (2018), “watching others make decisions is a nation that will
succumb to anger and resentment—witness the United States.”
Anger and resentment are certainly the net effect here. As Webster (2020) noted, anger
may motivate partisan voters, but it produces significant distrust in voters, too. This distrust
permeates not only in social relationships, but also in terms of governmental institutions. Trust in
government has declined significantly since the 1950s, dropping from 73% in 1958 to 17% in
2019.4 Likewise, resentment is widespread in American political debate, exacerbated by the rise
of populist rhetoric that divides society into “us versus them” (Mudde, 2004). Indeed, diversity is
considered a barrier to the “good life,” both politically and personally. Otherwise, democraticbased populist movements still “deemphasize differences among the group on whose behalf they
claim to speak, depicting group members as wholly equivalent with each other and utterly
different than those outside the collective identity” (Lowndes, 2017, p. 242), a tactic not unlike
what Donald Trump weaponized during his presidential campaigns (Mason et al., 2021). Not
surprisingly, such “othering” of ethnic and racial minorities serves a twofold partisan purpose: It
induces resentment and stokes anger.
Significant societal and political strife is boiling over. Relying on governmental
institutions to “hold” is wishful thinking, too, given the decline in trust that builds up such
institutions (Hetherington, 2005; Putnam, 2000). Shared experiences once provided the means of
creating sociopolitical bonds between diverse segments of society in order to transcend policy
disagreements. Previously, Americans’ engagement in civil society groups attempted to foster at
least a degree of mutual respect and democratic norms—however imperfect—for sustaining civic
society. Deliberation over shared governance problems provided some minimal guardrails to
keep American politics on track. As we describe in the next section, though, a long-festering
decay in American society became acute due to an unprecedented public health crisis breaking

3

While the pandemic did bring isolation, it was still a shared experience, and surrounding messaging emphasized
both a united front and a common experience in the same way that previous unifying events have. We are grateful
for an anonymous reviewer’s comment making this observation.
4
Trust somewhat recovered in 2021, with about a quarter (24%) of Americans saying they trust the federal
government to do what is right always or most of the time, but nonetheless remains historically low (Pew Research
Center, 2021).
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out at the moment when American society was least equipped to come together around a shared
experience in the face of adversity.
The Ultimate Inflection Point
The lost language of democratic values, the perfect filtering of dissenting opinions, and
the lack of common experiences to create shared values led to January 6, 2021. The reliance on
the marketplace of ideas to filter out the “bad ideas” failed because competition necessarily has
to give equal hearing to every potential opinion and, like any market, is subject to market failure.
A “crisis of inequality” (Vermeiren, 2021) that follows the neoliberal subject intensified the
feeling of isolation and distrust already felt by those who see institutions and elites as newly
found enemies. Forced to echo chambers and message boards, there was no check on the extreme
nature of the claims, and a sense of being left behind reinforced the feeling that these things
could be true.
Throughout most of 2020, COVID-19 removed people from their daily lives outside of
the home—often the only place where their filtering was not perfectly attuned—and forced them
to stay home with ample time to see not only the government but COVID-19 itself as a
conspiracy to undo any safety they had left. In fact, COVID-19 became a sort of training ground
for anti-government armed protest. State capitols across the country were faced with armed
persons who lacked trust in the science and the government, demanding the reopening of
businesses, schools, and more in the face of growing infections and death. These protests were
not all armed and high-tension, but the frequency with which guns and violent rhetoric appeared
was not coincidental. In many ways, the COVID-19 protests in state capitols honed the
performative and dangerous rage that would soon be in the nation’s capital. More than that, it
helped build the online and word-of-mouth networks that would be key to facilitating an
unprecedented breech of the U.S. Capitol building.
Civic values fall prey to the economization of all facets of life and can only survive if
they produce measurable benefits in the marketplace. Currently, there is no reward for being a
good citizen of the like that Madison and the other Founders envisioned. Instead, there is ample
incentive to rely on anger and division since they, at the very least, provide an outlet for growing
resentment and antagonism. The aggrieved are aggrieved for a reason—and their anger spilled
over on January 6th into bloodshed. The intense feeling of being ignored has been happening for
quite some time as the state has worked to support the market while “democratic commitments to
equality, liberty, inclusion, and constitutionalism are now subordinate to the project of economic
growth, competitive positioning, and capital enhancement” (Brown, 2015, p. 263). This
competition that has left them behind seems coordinated as the attack that was carried out on
January 6th through their anger and lack of connection.
On January 6, 2021, the individuals who would soon become insurrectionists—now
trained and well-connected from 8 months at home dealing with anti-governmental protests over
COVID-19—were gathered in person and face-to-face to grieve their case of government
corruption and fraudulent election results. The anger that led them there is not simple to
understand. While former President Trump himself had a role to play, the fact is that he was
more symptom than disease. Capitol insurrectionists were convinced that the 2020 presidential
election was being stolen, making Trump’s rhetoric a call to action rather than political
hyperbole. Trump’s unwillingness to concede and his battle cry for others to confront Congress
in person was just the match that lit the kindling and stoked the fuel that had saturated it.
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Confronted with the belief that the election and the state governments across the country that
conducted it—the very state governments that were already deemed to be inept and overbearing
throughout the pandemic—were in coordination was not a far leap to make when the deck
already seemed so stacked by the same actors. Pushed to isolation, these actors were armed with
little to help imagine, let alone attain, a robust democratic life where their concerns are heard by
system actors and reflected by public policy. In many ways, January 6th was not only predictable
but almost inevitable.
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